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ç The objective of this paper is to elucidate the relationship between the reform process and economic performance in the 
states of the former Soviet Union (FSU).  There were two strategies used by the former Soviet states to cope with the 
collapse of the USSR.   Some of the FSU countries, in an effort to overcome the institutional vacuum caused by the 
disintegration of the federal economy, centralized their government authority to manage industry.   Others decentralized 
power in an attempt to regain economic independence for domestic enterprises.  To evaluate the essential differences and 
progress gaps among transition strategies, FSU countries can be divided into three groups, which reflect variations in 
institutional control of the government-business relationships.  The differences in economic performance in FSU 
countries can be explained to some extent by examining the diversity of institutional patterns that characterize each 
category.  The results of various empirical analyses positively support the validity of such an analytical framework.  In 
this sense, this paper presents a new viewpoint on the transition process in FSU countries that may complement that 
shown in existing literature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The process of pushing toward a market economy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) has now become an important trend characterizing 
the present world economy, together with the globalization process and the unification of the 
EU economies.  Consequently, the experiences and results accumulated throughout the last ten 
years or so in these countries have been examined multilaterally in theory and according to 
empirical research.  In other words, this is a set of specific assumptions defining the near 
future of the world economy and not merely a historical review.   
The main trend in this field of research is determined by a series of empirical studies, 
which econometrically examine the relationships between reform processes and macroeconomic 
performances in transition economies.  Some pioneers in this field include researchers such as 
de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1996), Sachs (1996), Fischer et al. (1996), Selowsky and Martin 
(1997), and Hernández-Catá (1997).  The more recent ones include: Fischer and Sahay (2000), 
Falcetti et al. (2000), Wyplosz (2000), Havrylyshyn and Wolf (2001), and Weder (2001).  
Moreover, the following reports published by international financial organizations play a vital 
role in inspiring discourse in the field: Transition Report by  EBRD, World Economic Outlook 
(2000) by IMF, World Development Report (1996), and Transition - the First Ten Years (2002) 
by World Bank. 
Thanks to the broad and keen discussions among researchers that took place at the turn of 
the century, we have come to know very suggestive information regarding the relationships 
among various factors (such as structural reforms, liberalization, initial conditions, institutional 
changes, and lapse of time) and the economic crisis during the first stages of transition 
accompanied by the subsequent recovery process in former socialist countries.    However, some 
facts have been unreasonably disregarded in earlier studies. For instance, the unresolved puzzle 
of why recession in the FSU, including the Baltic states, was more serious than that in CEE.  
Furthermore, it is mysterious that some FSU countries that were reluctant to move toward a 
market economy, in fact, recorded relatively good economic results, contrary to the expectations 
of many. 
ç   A viewpoint that has met great approval is the notion that, in light of the transition to a 
market economy, the sudden disappearance of the federal government, which caused an 
economically destructive decrease in productivity, presented an overwhelming challenge that 
only FSU states have had to face.    Based on this opinion and interpreting transitional strategies 
of FSU countries as a reaction pattern to the collapse of the federal economic system, we 
attempt to shed new light on the causes behind reform results and economic performance 
throughout a decade of transition.  In other words, the objective of this paper is to illustrate a 
new opinion that can explain, with some consistency, the experiences of FSU countries, 
including Belarus and Uzbekistan, which have been regarded as exceptions.  In this sense, a 
new viewpoint, which may complement existing literature, is proposed to explain the transition 
economies. Transition Strategies and Economic Performances  2
The paper is organized as follows: the first section closely describes and details 
achievements and unsolved problems of earlier studies.  In the second section, transition 
strategies of FSU states are re-construed as reaction patterns to the collapse of the federal 
economic system.  The third section then treats the relationship between a transition strategy 
and its economic performance.    The fourth section conducts empirical analysis using panel data.   
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the results and major implications of the findings. 
 
1. ACHIEVEMENTS OF PRECEDING STUDIES AND REMAINING ISSUES 
Empirical studies examining the relationship between the reform process and macroeconomic 
performance in CEE and FSU countries flourished in the late 1990s.   Two main reasons can be 
pointed out to explain how these studies developed.    One is that several countries in the region 
simultaneously overcame the initial transformational recession (Kornai, 1944) and got back on a 
growth track.  This fact, at least in the short term, caught the attention of economists, who 
wondered about the primary policy factors in play that set prosperous transitional states apart 
from the failures.  The second reason is the accumulation of statistical data and the 
improvement of its quality.    This new reality has allowed researchers to include more details in 
their econometric analyses.  It goes without saying that time is extremely important.  Yet 
reform efforts by each government in the field of statistics and technical support by 
international financial organizations have made far more statistical data accessible than ever 
before.  Hence, the new materials have motivated researchers to use econometric analysis to 
understand the transition economies. 
ç     It is not hard to imagine that de Melo et al. (1996) and other researchers in the initial 
period were encouraged by the factors mentioned above.  In addition, the interest at that time 
lay in the suitability of the so-called “Washington Consensus.”    It means that at the crux of the 
matter was the issue of whether a radical transition was superior or inferior, right or wrong, 
compared to gradualism.  Therefore, the focus of the analysis was concentrated on the 
relationship among the positiveness of structural reform, the speed of liberalization, and the 
economic performance.    The World Development Report, published by the World Bank in 1996, 
offered a provisional evaluation of reform achievements in transition economies.  Some of the 
messages in this report are summarized as follows: “Countries that liberalize rapidly and 
extensively turn around more quickly; After seven years, aggressive liberalizers in CEE and the 
NIS have come out ahead; Progress with liberalization brings down inflation.”
1  ç These 
statements boldly sum up the main results from the earlier empirical studies. 
ç     A number of critics have subsequently challenged earlier research, namely, by contesting 
the analytical techniques and policy implications.  Among these critics are Christoffersen and 
Doyle (1998).  After discovering a close relationship between the trend in output and the 
expansion of the export market, they warned that panel data analyses that disregard such 
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relationships may over-emphasize the negative influence of inflation on output.  Moreover, 
Heybey and Murrell (1999) pointed out methodological mistakes, such as standard 
omitted-variables bias, in the regression analysis and the use of the calendar year to compare 
transitional countries.  Heybey and Murrell strongly opposed the conviction held by some 
researchers that there is a definite correlation between the speed of reform and economic 
performance.  In Japan, Nishimura (1999) stated that it was a grave error to consider 
“historically advanced nations of liberalization” (p. 302), which achieved structural reform 
during the socialist era (i.e., Hungary and Poland), as countries promoting a rapid and 
aggressive liberalization in the initial period of transition.  Therefore, he argued that 
assertions of a connection between the speed of liberalization and economic growth are weakly 
grounded. 
Based on the existing research including such criticisms, arguments have been 
developed by giving attention to the refinement of analytical methods and to factors other than 
structural reform and liberalization.  That is to say, Havrylyshyn et al. (1998), Wolf (1999), 
Berg et al. (1999), and Fischer and Sahay (2000) introduced more accurate regression models 
and re-examined growth in terms of the effects of reform and liberalization.  Moreover, de 
Melo et al. (1997, 2001), Falcetti et al. (2000), and Havrylyshyn and Wolf (2001) developed an 
analytical methodology that ingeniously accounted for particular regional problems, such as 
initial historical conditions, conflicts, civil strife, and economic sanctions.    In the meantime, a 
number of empirical studies were conducted to help understand the various institutional factors 
that affect economic activities (i.e., property rights, governance, bribery, corruption, and the 
civil society).  Brunetti et al. (1997), Mores (1999), Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2000), 
Campos (2000), Weder (2001), and Garibaldi et al. (2001) are the most representative works in 
this field. 
ç   As a result of the above heated but constructive arguments, today there is consensus among 
researchers about the relationship between the process of transition and macroeconomic 
performance.    There is conformity on the following five points:     
(a) The stabilization of prices and the financial system is an indispensable condition for output 
recovery in the initial period of transition; 
(b) Structural reform and liberalization prompt output recovery.  However, this positive effect 
is non-linear and often involves a time lag; 
(c) The initial historical conditions are extremely important, but the effects on output are 
gradually decreasing.  In addition, situations, such as war and economic sanctions, have 
particular regional significance; 
(d) In order to keep economic growth stable, institutions play a key role, and their importance 
increases steadily as the transition towards a market economy progresses; 
(e) The traditional inputs, such as capital and labor, were not necessarily the decisive factors in 
output recovery at the first stage of economic transformation.
2 
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It is probably not an unrelated issue that the IMF (2000) and the World Bank (2002) give 
greater importance to initial conditions, institutional design of economic systems, and political 
factors as elements determining macroeconomic performance in post-communist countries and 
that the debate has evolved considerably since the late 1990s.   
The five points listed above are generally accepted and provide an understanding of 
economic transitional processes, which are applicable to the FSU.  However, it is well known 
that under poor initial conditions and being far behind in structural reform and liberalization, 
several FSU countries achieved relatively stable economic growth.  Thus, it is inevitable to 
think that there must be some errors and oversights in the aforementioned stylized facts.  The 
reason could be rooted in some unrealistic hypotheses (at least for FSU countries) adopted 
tacitly by earlier studies, which tried to compare comprehensively situations without excluding 
any of the former Socialist countries around the globe.  First, these studies assume a priori 
that the government’s attitude toward the market economy of transitional countries is inflexible 
and consistent.  Second, according to prevailing thought, the differences in the reform 
processes of each country have had to do only with pace and achievement rather than with 
actual structural reform and liberalization.  Third, in much of the existing literature, 
transitional countries were presupposed to have had a self-completed social and economic 
system at the start of the transition. 
However, the actual conditions of FSU countries were remarkably different from the 
implicit assumptions mentioned above.  In the FSU, there were numerous countries that were 
making the transition with little hint of ideological “radicalism” or “gradualism.”    Furthermore, 
some of the early studies describe these countries as “slow reformers” or as those “in a state of 
inaction,” when, in reality, crisis management measures had been expeditiously and consistently 
put in place by the governments.  Sometimes these countries had even surpassed other FSU 
countries.  Lastly, for FSU countries whose systemic transition originated in the collapse of 
the USSR, the assumption of a self-completed social and economic system is extremely remote 
from the actual situations.    Indifference to these facts has caused many researchers to overlook 
important issues.    It seems that serious mistakes were caused by a lack of consideration history, 
that is, the sudden disappearance of the federal economic system in the USSR.  Therefore, 
focusing on this matter, an attempt is made in the next section to re-interpret the transitional 
strategy of the FSU countries.   
 
2ɽ ɽ ɽ ɽTHE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND DIVERSIFICATION 
OF THE TRANSITION STRATEGIES OF FSU COUNTRIES 
It is unnecessary to emphasize that FSU countries only played a role as “sub-systems” in the 
unified and highly centralized economy of the Soviet Union.  Not surprisingly, in comparison 
to other COMECOM members, the economic system in these countries was less prosperous in 
terms of systemic independency.  In addition, in the Soviet Union, central administration 
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organizations, represented by the all-union ministries and the union-republican ministries, were 
widely instituted in the industrial sector.  Such organizations imposed their authority over 
major enterprises and factories in each state directly and exclusively.
3    In other words, in each 
state of the FSU, a production system was widely operational, even beyond the control of the 
highest decision-making authority of a given state and its council of ministers (Figure 1). 
Facts relative to this issue are shown in Table 1.  In 1989, industries under federal 
jurisdiction (IFJ) produced 61.4% of the gross industrial output of the entire Soviet Union.   
Similarly, the shares of labor and fixed capital committed to the same sector were at extremely 
high levels: 64.2% and 81.1%, respectively.  This is to say, the IFJ overwhelmed the Soviet 
industry.    Thus, when attention is turned to the states, it can be seen that the weight of the IFJ 
on output varied from 69.0% in Russia to 28.4% in Moldova.  However, when fixed capital is 
set as a standard, in most of the republics, the weight of the IFJ goes far beyond 50%, with 
Russia leading at 86.8%.  This clarifies the IFJ’s central role in capital-intensive heavy 
industries in every republic.  In addition, the same table suggests that the states’ economies 
were extremely dependent on foreign trade.  Moreover, exports and imports within the Soviet 
Union represented an overwhelming part of trade activities of the states.  As it is widely 
known, intermediate goods formed the bulk of regional trade in the Soviet Union, and this kind 
of trade was handled mainly by interconnected state-owned enterprises.  Because of this 
establishment, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a twofold systemic crisis.  On 
the one hand, there was a partial or total loss of the superior decision-making organs of 
enterprises at the center of production activities, and, on the other hand, the interruption of 
trade relationships and industrial activities spread from organizations of central authority in all 
directions.  There has never been another example of transformation on such a grand scale as 
that of the states of the FSU moving out of an enormously defective economic system.  
Therefore, the decisive factors in prescribing the course of progress for output performance and 
the economic system depend on the transition strategy that a government enacts to deal with 
unprecedented economic woes.    This implies that parameters such as speed and achievement of 
reform were unsuitable for describing the degree of the transition toward a market economy in 
this region. 
ç    Depending on the reaction pattern to the collapse of the federal economic system, the 
transition strategies adopted by the FSU countries can be divided broadly into two categories.  
The first category is “centralization strategy,” which was designed to overcome the 
institutional vacuum that immediately followed the breakdown of the Soviet Union by 
concentrating supervisory authority over enterprises into the government of the new sovereign 
state and restructuring industrial organization. 
  In the countries that adopted this strategy, the governments introduced several elements 
                                             
3 The union-republican ministries mean industrial-sector ministries, and were established both in the center and republics.  
The ministries at the republic level were under the control of the superior branches of the federal government and the 
council of ministers of the given republic (Nove, 1986, p. 5). Transition Strategies and Economic Performances  6
of a market economy.  However, they reconstructed the vertical and centralized industrial 
management system to maintain strong economic influence over domestic industries.  In other 
words, the government approved liberalization in the fields of price formation, enterprise 
transaction, and labor contracts while securing ways to actively interfere with production 
activities.  The following measures were therefore taken: (1) The official price system was 
maintained for energy and major products; (2) The state order and centralized trade regimes 
were maintained for major exports; (3) State ownership was maintained over major enterprises, 
and an enclosure of privatized enterprise stocks was protected by government-ruled financial 
and commercial organizations; (4) The exclusive possession of foreign capital was defended by 
the state through a multiple exchange rate system and a surrender requirement for export 
earnings.  In these countries, many of the economic ministries and sectoral production 
associations
4 from the Soviet era still exist in largely the same way.    In some cases, they have 
been ostensibly reorganized as semi-governmental business organizations or business concerns.  
In reality, however, they were acting as management intermediaries to materialize state control 
over enterprises. 
ç   The second category is “decentralization strategy,” which attempted to recover economic 
independence by radically decentralizing discretionary powers to domestic enterprises. These 
included the former centralized enterprises that had lost superior decision-making bodies.  
Transferring economic power of the government to the enterprise sector was in complete 
agreement with the policy goal of marketization.  Therefore, FSU countries that selected the 
decentralization strategy almost wholly adopted certain measures, such as introducing a law 
system that secures private enterprise activities, market liberalization, and the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises.  In the governments, many of the economic ministries were 
streamlined, and sectoral production associations were converted, one after another, into private 
enterprise organizations, stock holding companies, or management consulting companies.    As a 
result, countries that had chosen decentralization strategy established an economic system that 
was much more decentralized than it had been in the socialist era. 
To reflect the essential differences and progress gaps among transitional strategies, 
government-business relationships in FSU countries came to have three institutional patterns.  
The following three items were the major differences in the patterns: (1) Countermeasures used 
to combat the economic crisis after the breakdown of the USSR; (2) The allocation of formal 
decision-making authorities to determine enterprise strategies; (3) Corporate monitoring and 
governance style.  Focusing on the governmental commitment to corporate management, each 
institutional pattern is named hereafter as the Order State, the Rescue State, and the Punish 
State (Hands-off State), respectively.  Each state model is illustrated in Table 2, along with 
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other aspects of the reform process. 
Order State 
Government business relationships are prescribed by the centralization strategy, which 
means that the government collectively leads the industrial sector in order to stabilize all output 
activity in the nation to combat a potential series of macro-shocks that could affect the entire 
domestic economy.  Meanwhile, compensation is given for obeying government commands; 
enterprises are supplied with goods and financial support.  When it comes to corporate 
management, the deciding vote in strategic decision-making
 belongs to the government leader or 
to an administrative head appointed by the government.
5  ç To use this authority effectively, the 
government monitors each corporation at all times and intervenes in corporate management 
activities as necessary.  The following countries are included in this category: Belarus, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan, beginning in the 1990s. 
Rescue State 
Government business relationships are determined by the decentralization strategy. In this 
case, when facing financial crises, the government enforces more general policy packages in 
order to ease the crisis instead of directly participating in corporate management.  Each 
enterprise is called upon to deal with the crisis based on its own judgment of the circumstances 
and management strategy.  Therefore, the formal decision-making authority in management 
strategy belongs, in principal, to the corporate manager.  Consequently, the top manager is 
responsible for the principal task of corporate management.  On the other hand, the 
government limits its actions by dispatching officials from the ministries and the State Asset 
Committee to meetings of shareholders and/or to a board of auditors, and, in addition, it 
conducts periodical inspections to examine the condition of financial affairs.    The Rescue State 
certainly does not conduct systematic monitoring, as is done by the Order State.    However, if a 
corporation falls into a crisis that threatens its survival, the government, after temporally 
divesting itself of the decision-making authority, eventually rescues enterprises ex post facto by 
injecting capital and reshuffling the executive officers.    Countries that fall under this category 
are: Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine, the Baltic countries in the first half of the 1990s, and Azerbaijan and Tajikistan in the 
latter half of 1990s. 
Punish State (Hands-off State) 
This sort of state is an institutionally developed version of the Rescue State (or Hands-off 
State).   In this category, the roles of the government and an enterprise are divided more 
precisely.  ç In addition, the crisis management system is more decentralized and exhaustive 
                                             
5 Included here areɼ(1) Establishment/merger/dissolution of corporation; (2) Adoption and change of corporation charter; 
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Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, presidential decrees and cabinet resolutions that give approvals to these matters are 
promulgated widely. Furthermore, occasionally, “orders” and “approvals” by ministries and government offices to 
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than that of the Rescue State.    The decision-making authority in corporate management belongs 
to corporate managers formally and in practice.  Consequently, the government avoids direct 
participation in corporate management.  In addition, when corporate management suffers 
financial reverses, the government impartially executes a plan to reorganize assets and 
resuscitate enterprises in accordance with domestic laws, including bankruptcy laws.  In 
contrast with the Rescue State, the Punish State does not conduct ex post facto rescues in 
principle.    The Baltic states of the latter half of 1990s belong to this category.   
As stated above, the relationships between the government and enterprises in FSU 
countries showed signs of diversification as early as immediately after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  Here, the attitudes of government leaders toward the role of the nation in a 
market economy and in the national economy and the public mentality were reflected.  As the 
reform process diverged and deepened, the institutional relationship between the government 
and businesses became clearer.  Of course, within actual government-business relationships in 
FSU countries, there were intricately interwoven patterns.  The differences among countries 
are drawn by questions of degree or measurement.  This notwithstanding, it seems that the 
above-mentioned institutional patterns characterize the transitional economic systems of each 
FSU country fairly well.    Thus, the next section is a deliberation on the causality in the reform 
process and economic performance that is developed by using the analytical framework 
presented so far. 
 
3. GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
First of all, the following points are examined: (1) The relation between production activity and 
the centralizing/decentralizing crisis management system to combat macro-shocks, and (2) The 
influence of each particular institutional pattern on the incentive level of the government and 
business entities.  Based on the results of this examination, several assumptions are presented 
regarding the economic performance of FSU countries. 
Order State, Rescue State, and Punish State 
ç   When it comes to countermeasures against macro-shocks, the centralized production 
adjustment system does not always prevail over non-centrally-controlled production activities 
based on decentralized decision-making.  This is because, as Crémer (1990) and Aoki (1995) 
suggests, the information processing ability and the institutional and organizational conditions 
of decision-making entities vastly influence the production efficiency of both systems.   
Therefore, to judge the superiority and inferiority of these different crisis management systems, 
it is necessary to examine their ability to cope with crises under their actual circumstances, 
namely, the initial period of economic transformation. 
In this sense, it is highly possible that the government in the Order State had already 
enacted a formulated plan to cope with economic crisis and that it had been executed effectively.   
There are three reasons for this: (1) A sixty-year-old bureaucratic organization with much 
knowledge and experience in planned economy; (2) A vertically integrated business group Transition Strategies and Economic Performances  9
established in each particular industry; and (3) Highly centralized industrial organizations.  
Under these conditions, it is more than possible to demonstrate powerful control over domestic 
industries while advancing toward a market economy.  For example, the government of 
Uzbekistan organizes a nationwide production and distribution system for its raw cotton every 
year in order to fulfill state orders and operate under a centralized trade system.    In 1998, nine 
governmental economic associations, two state-owned companies, and four state-owned 
commercial banks played a vital role in providing state support for cotton farms and cotton 
processing.  This fact proves that, even today, personnel and organizations inherited from the 
Soviet era are indispensable to the Karimov administration in order to materialize the 
production cycle of raw cotton controlled by the government.
6 
ç      On the other hand, countermeasures pertaining to the Rescue State were very problematic.  
First of all, the market infrastructure for the commodity exchange market and the banking 
system were not sufficiently developed.  In addition, management consulting businesses and 
information services for corporations were underdeveloped.  Under these circumstances, 
therefore, it was impossible to expect corporations to react quickly and effectively enough.  It 
must also be noted that the majority of corporations with an organizational structure 
reminiscent of the Soviet era lacked a subsystem for processing information, namely, a 
marketing department and a sales department.  Consequently, a macro-shock eventually did 
corner many corporations, which then had to be rescued from bankruptcy by the government.     
In fact, FSU countries that had adopted a decentralization strategy had to put various relief 
measures into operation to avoid a chain reaction of corporate bankruptcies.   These relief 
measures included: (1) Deficit compensation to state-owned corporations and mixed ownership 
corporations from the national budget; (2) An emergency loan from the Central Bank; (3) The 
transfer of a corporation’s accumulated debts to the national debt; (4) Emergency import 
measures of industrial material for domestic industries; (5) Capital injection into major 
enterprises and their restructuring by utilizing facilities of international financial organizations, 
as positive actions; (6) A grace period for companies in deficit to apply for bankruptcy; and (7) 
Counterproductive policy such as intentionally overlooking the payment of corporate taxes, as 
passive ones.  To what extent these relief measures eased macro-shock is unknown. However, 
hardly any industrial enterprises went bankrupt until very recently in countries that chose the 
centralized strategy (i.e. Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan).  This clarifies that the 
corporate support of the Rescue State is less effective than that of the Order State in restraining 
the chain reaction of corporate bankruptcy. 
As for the Punish State, one would expect a greater macro-shock than in the Order State or 
the Rescue State ceteris paribus.    This is because, in the Punish State, the government does not 
grant relief after a shock.    However, this is only a hypothesis because no Punish State ever had 
to deal with an economic crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
ç    The focus now turns to the institutional patterns of each state model and how they affect 
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the incentives of the government and business entities.  Aghion and Tirole (1997) state that 
under the asymmetrical information, when a principal and an agent whose interests are not the 
same to make a decision on a project, the allocation of the formal decision-making authority 
contrastively affects the effort levels in the collection of information and in acquiring 
specialized knowledge.    According to them, the reallocation of formal authority from one party 
to another makes the effort level of the former lower and that of the latter higher.   
ç     With systemic transformation underway, almost all governments in FSU countries are major 
asset holders and/or stakeholders among a majority of domestic corporations.  Moreover, it is 
inevitable that the government and corporations will sharply oppose each other in many respects.   
This is because the government longs for a stable operation of its national economy and wants 
to secure a certain level of employment. On the other hand, the domestic firms aim to maximize 
profits and to streamline the managerial structure.  Thus, if we regard the government as the 
principal and the corporations as the agents, the implications considered by Aghion and Tirole 
(1997) could be restated as follows: The agent puts more effort into management in the Rescue 
State and the Punish State (where the corporation can determine its own corporate strategy 
independently) than in the Order State (where the authority over the corporate strategy is 
occupied by the government leaders or the administrative heads whom they entrust).   
Conversely, as for the principal, his desire to reign is stronger in the Order State than in the 
Rescue State and the Punish State.  The interests of the government and the corporations were 
no less at odds than were the interests of the shareholders and the managers, or those of the 
manufacturers and the suppliers.    Thus, these very different motivations are by-products of the 
allocation of formal authority.  This is extremely suggestive when it comes to understanding 
the government and corporate relationships in FSU countries.  In addition, it is quite obvious 
that, when the Rescue State and the Punish State are compared, the effort level of a corporate 
manager in the Punish State, where the dispersion of the decision-making authority is more 
thorough and ex post facto relief is excluded, is greater than it is in the Rescue State, where the 
desire of the government to control corporations is lower.
7 
Assumptions 
ç   Three assumptions regarding the economic performance of FSU countries can be drawn 
from the above examination.  First, it is quite possible that the countries with an institutional 
pattern similar to that of the Order State could lead domestic industry and very effectively 
support corporations.  In other words, an Order State tends to use the knowledge and 
experience of a planned economy, existing institutions and organizations inherited from the 
Soviet era, and highly concentrated industrial organizations.  In such a state, these were 
considered very effective measures to avoid the disorganization of inter-corporation 
transactions and financing activities that originated after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  In 
addition, this institutional pattern could even prevent disorders in trade activities.  Hence, the 
                                             
7 See Iwasaki (2001a) and the Iwasaki (2002a) supplement (pp. 46-47) for a closer demonstration of the above discussion 
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governments in this group could effectively restrain the decrease in production triggered by the 
economic macro-shock in the initial period of transition by choosing the centralized crisis 
management system. 
ç   Secondly, FSU countries categorized as the Rescue States or the Punish States were 
relatively vulnerable in comparison to the Order State in terms of the economic crises.  There 
are three reasons for this assumption: (1) It is extremely difficult for the corporations to act 
quickly enough with underdeveloped market infrastructures; (2) Corporate relief ex post facto is 
not as effective as the continuous corporate assistance by the Order State in controlling a chain 
reaction of management failure and corporate bankruptcy; (3) It is possible that the IMF’s rigid 
fiscal discipline, along with the oppressive fiscal deficit at the time, seriously restrained the 
government’s ex post facto relief. 
ç   Thirdly, in the Rescue State and the Punish State, the transfer of discretionary powers to 
the corporate sector was conducted positively.  Thus, it is assumed that, in such a state, the 
effort to improve the management system was more effervescent than in the Order State, in 
which formal decision-making authorities were concentrated in the central government.  In 
contrast to that, in the Order State, the government’s motivation to control corporations is 
relatively stronger than in the other two types of state.  Therefore, it is predictable that a 
government of an Order State tends to shoulder a larger fiscal burden to prove its actions.  
This point can be strengthened by the clear inference that there must be a major difference in 
corporation monitoring costs among the Order State, which always supervises corporations, the 
Rescue State, which uses its sovereignty over management according to the management 
situation, and the Punish State, which deals solely with the legalities of corporate bankruptcy. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The arguments above emphasize that the divergence of the transitional strategies and the 
institutional diversification of the government-business relationship caused by the collapse of 
the federal economic system, are very important factors in deciding the economic performance 
of an FSU state.  Such a performance encompasses macroeconomic growth, enterprise reform, 
and public finance.  In fact, there is a clear difference in the average economic performance 
for each state group (Table 3).   Moreover, this fact seems to positively support the theoretical 
assumptions mentioned earlier.   This section is an attempt to empirically verify the validity of 
the analytical framework of this paper.   
ç   Let us begin by examining the relationship between the reform process and economic 
performance in each FSU country.  Both retain aspects that can be described with many 
different parameters. For this reason, hierarchical cluster analysis and principal component 
analysis were chosen as the analytical methods.  Firstly, cluster analysis classified FSU 
countries from two standpoints: reform process and economic performance.  This analysis 
deals with parallelism in reform procedures and economic performance.  In order to rate a 
reform process, seven indexes have been chosen to indicate structural reform variables and Transition Strategies and Economic Performances  12
another five indexes to account for the political system and the extent of governmental 
intervention in economic activities.    As for economic performance, six variables indicating the 
status of the private sector, output performance, enterprise reform, and national expenditure on 
the production sector have been interwoven.  In carrying out the analysis, variables are 
standardized so that the mean equals 0 and the dispersion 1.  For the agglomerative method, 
the Ward method was chosen because of its widespread utilization. 
ç   Table 4 shows the results from the cluster analysis for four years (1997-2000).  Here, in 
conformity with the argument in the previous section, FSU countries are combined into three 
clusters.  In parentheses, the Euclidian distance of each country from Estonia, the leader in 
terms of marketization, is shown for reference.    According to section (a) in the table, as for the 
reform process, FSU countries can be divided into three groups, namely, (1) the Baltic states, 
(2) Belarus, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and (3) the rest of the countries.      In addition, clusters 
I, II, and III correspond to high, middle, and low groups, respectively, according to their degree 
of decentralization of the economic system and to government neutrality.  Estonia and 
Turkmenistan, as can be easily seen, are always on the extreme positions.
8  Moreover, results 
reflect the process of moving toward a market economy in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan and how 
these two countries caught up with the rest, despite being late starters.  On the other hand, 
section (b) in the table, which depicts economic performance, confirms that each cluster is 
composed mostly of the same countries as those in the reform process.  In fact, the rate of 
correspondence reached 87 per cent.  This strongly suggests that a classification of FSU 
countries based on the argument in the previous section is very effective because it helps to 
highlight the qualitative differences in economic performance.    The result from 1997, however, 
shows a concentration of exceptional cases. ç This indicates that the influence of armed 
conflicts and civil war in the early 1990s and the cumulative effects of structural reform were 
very important factors in determining the economic results of FSU countries. 
In addition, we conducted additional cluster analysis prior to 1997 and comprehensively 
surveyed various studies focusing on economic reform by country and region.
9ç On the basis of 
all these inquiries, fifteen FSU countries were classified by year in the period 1992-2001 into 
one of these three categories.  Table 5 demonstrates the result.  This chronological 
classification is used to assess the production regression model mentioned later. 
ç   To back up the intuitive understanding of cluster analysis, we conducted principal 
component analysis with data from the aforesaid 18 variables for 1997 and 2000.  Table 6 
summarizes the main results of the analysis.  First and foremost, let us pay attention to the 
first two components, whose cumulative proportion of total variance is over 71 per cent.  
Based on the value of each Eigenvector and component loading, the first component can be 
                                             
ÿçIn fact, the Euclidian distance of the two countries was the greatest every year in all combinations. ç
9 This includes the following case studies, including some on Central Asia by the author: Genka (1998), Pomfret (2000), 
Isnolnitel'nyi Komitet Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv (2001), Korolev (2001), Grinberg and Vardomskii (2001), 
Matsnev (2001), Bartlett (2001), Korhonen (2001), Iwasaki (2001a), Iwasaki (2002b), Siegelbaum et al. (2002), and the 
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interpreted as the comprehensive index of the reform process and the second as the economic 
performance.  Thus, the component scores of each FSU state against values for the first two 
principal components are plotted in Figure 2.  As in Table 4, Figure 2 also confirms that FSU 
countries are divided steadily into three groups throughout both points in time.  Moreover, a 
most remarkable fact is that, between 1997 and 2000, the distances among groups grew, whereas 
the concentration within them became denser.    This suggests a stronger correlation between the 
reform process and economic performance of FSU countries during the later 1990s. 
Following theses analysis, the degree of the macro-shock that took place after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, which affected the output performance of FSU countries, was 
examined.        Due to data limitations, the macro-shock impact has been measured by estimating 
regression models of the real growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) and the 
industrial production (INP) of each FSU country to the weighted average of the economic 
growth rate of all FSU countries without the given state (FSU) and Regional Tension Dummy 
(RTD).
10 The goal is to compare the degrees of macro-shock by evaluating the value of the 
regression coefficient of all explanatory variables and the coefficient of determination.  The 
analysis is divided into two periods: (1) 1992-1996, the period of the serious economic crisis 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and (2) 1992-2001, the first decade of transition.  
Three cases were used to obtain the regression model estimate: (1) the Order State (OS), (2) the 
Rescue State and the Punish State (RS+PS), and (3) all FSU countries (ALL FSU).  In the last 
equation, the Order State Dummy (OSD) was added to the explanatory variables.   
ç           The results are shown in Table 7.    As it is clearly shown, the results of the two groups 
contrast starkly.  The regression coefficient of the FSU in the case of the OS is far smaller 
than that of PS+RS.   Furthermore, the results that take an industrial production growth rate as 
the dependent variable are not even statistically significant.  On the other hand, the results in 
the case of PS+RS are satisfactory in general.    In addition, the value of the FSU clearly attests 
to the intensity of the macro-shock in the industrial sector.    This trend was more remarkable in 
the first five years of transition.  According to the estimates used to evaluate FSU countries 
(ALL FSU), the crisis management of the Order State played an inconspicuous but vital role, 
constituting about 3 per cent of GDP and about 9 per cent of industrial production.    This result 
is very consistent with the argument in the previous section, especially since the analytical 
framework of this paper focuses on the relationship between the government and industrial 
firms.    From the reasons given above, it can be inferred that those FSU countries that moved 
forward with the decentralization plan and showed a tendency toward helter-skelter in the initial 
period of transition experienced a stronger macro-shock in their production activities than the 
countries that preserved a centralized government-business relationship. 
ç   Finally, based on the results of these examinations, we conducted a regression analysis of 
GDP and industrial production growth (INP) during the first decade of transition.  The 
regression model is formularized as follows.  First, the natural logarithmic value of the 
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inflation rate (INF) and the Regional Tension Dummy (RTD) were introduced as base models.  
The natural logarithm of the inflation rate was approved for its high validity as an explanatory 
variable by many preceding studies.  The Initial Condition Index (ICD), developed by the 
EBRD, was also introduced as a variable dummy to control the differences among the initial 
conditions.    This index includes various initial conditions, such as the development level in the 
late Socialist period, years of experience in planned economy, geographical factors, and 
availability of natural resources.  Each country is given values from 0.0 for Lithuania to –3.4 
for Turkmenistan.
11  When the ICD was adopted, according to the discussion in section I, the 
radical time-decreasing effects of the initial conditions were taken into consideration.  Lastly, 
the state dummies OSD, PSD, and RSD were taken into consideration.  These dummies reflect 
the evolution of the government-business relationship that went along with the diversification 
of transitional strategies and the deepening of reform.  The values for these dummies took the 
duration time of each institutional pattern in accordance with Table 5 in order to reflect the 
accumulation effects of institutional development.  In addition, non-linear effects of the 
institutional development were also examined by estimating regression models that have the 
squared value of the state dummy as an explanatory variable.   Six different estimation 
equations for each explanatory variable (i.e., GDP and INP) were introduced for verifying the 
explanatory power of the variable dummy (ICD), the state dummies, and the robustness of the 
results. 
The results are listed in Table 8, which shows several interesting findings.    First, the INF 
and RTD have negative values and demonstrate a high level of significance and explanatory 
power in all cases.  This fact strongly supports many of the preceding studies.  Second, the 
apparent lack of significance of ICD matches the intuitive impression that there are many 
countries that have overcome poor initial conditions and managed to enjoy relatively good 
economic performance.  Third, the state dummies are statistically very significant in each 
model and remarkably improve the explanatory power as a whole. This tendency is especially 
strong in models I to L, which take the INP as explanatory variables.  In addition, the 
explanatory power of these models is relatively stronger than that of C to F which have GDP as 
the subject of explanatory variables.    These results confirm that the argument presented in this 
paper is useful for analysis, especially within the industrial sector.  Lastly, the relation 
OSD˺PSDʼRSD holds up in all cases in which state dummies are introduced.  This relation 
can be regarded as an additional proof of the argument mentioned above concerning the effect 
of the macro-shock on production activities.  Likewise, this fact also indicates that the 
institutional development from the Rescue  State to the Punish State may promise more 
satisfying economic performance in the near future. 
ç    The results of the empirical analysis presented here are highly consistent with the 
arguments presented in the previous sections.  Moreover, the results demonstrate that the 
analytical tool developed from a comparative institutional viewpoint may be an effective 
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approach to elucidate the causality between the reform process and the economic performance 
in FSU countries. 
  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The above examination can be summed up in the following five points: First, among existing 
literature that examines the relationship between the reform process and macroeconomic 
performance, some of it regards many of the countries of the FSU as exceptions due to a lack of 
analytical consideration for historical events, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union. Second, 
the transitional strategies of the countries of the FSU can be divided into two groups as a 
reaction pattern to the sudden disappearance of the soviet economy, namely the strategies of 
centralization and decentralization.    Third, reflecting differences in transition strategies and in 
the progress of reform, FSU counties have developed into three types of state groups, namely, 
the Order State, the Rescue State, and the Punish State (Hands-off State).    These are formed in 
light of a particular institutional arrangement of government-business relationships.  Fourth, 
the differences among the institutional patterns characterizing each state group can explain 
without contradiction the differences in economic performance that have appeared in various 
situations.  Finally, empirical analyses positively support the validity of the analytical 
framework of this paper. 
ç   One of the most important findings revealed here is that, contrary to the presumptions of 
many, a transitional strategy, which is far from the ideal transitional process to a market 
economy, was very workable in protecting citizens from serious economic damage after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.    Needless to say, the ultimate goal of the systemic transformation 
was to increase the wealth and welfare of the people in the post-communist world.  The 
transition toward a market economy is merely the means to an end.  The current population 
crisis in Russia symbolizes the immeasurable mischief that radical political and economic 
reforms have invited.
12   Hence, it is unwise to criticize political decision makers solely on the 
grounds that they do not follow the traditional path to a market economy. 
However, planned economies have demonstrated that centralization of economic power 
is no guarantee to a stable and dynamic economy over the long term.    The countries which can 
be regarded as Order States are yet to reflect seriously upon such lesson.    However, this is not 
the only problem.    As stressed in the third section, the advantage of the Order State lies in the 
robustness of its production activities against macro-shocks.    Since the negative effects caused 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union are easing day by day, the importance of decentralization, 
which works much better against individual shocks in terms of informational efficiency, is 
surely increasing.
13  Hence, it is quite possible that the advantage of the Order State is 
weakening.    In fact, the dispersion of the real growth rate of GDP and the industrial production 
of FSU countries have decreased widely when the two halves of the 10 years of transition (1992 
                                             
12 For details on the Russian population crisis, see Kuboniwa and Tabata (2002). 
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to 2001) are compared: from 131.6 to 26.1 and from 219.4 to 107.0, respectively.  This may 
reflect the rapid recovery in countries categorized as Rescue States or Punish States.  Because 
of the path-dependency and the inertia of institutional evolution, it is next to impossible to 
modify an economic system in order to immediately adjust to new environmental changes.  
Besides, to the political leaders in the Order States, recognizing the necessity for economic 
conversion constitutes a very risky political observation.    As Figure 3 suggests, if institutional 
crystallization deepens in the Order States, which is in fact currently taking place, there are 
fears that centralized systems, such as those in the Order States, will be “locked in” to an 
economic system that is entirely different from a capitalist market economy.  It is quite likely 
that further progress toward a market economy will be difficult for the Rescue and Punish States, 
which at present are in developmental stages.    Therefore, the systemic transformation from the 
Order State model presents an even more challenging scenario.ç
In conclusion, the best that can be hoped for is that countries adhering to centralization 
and undergoing policy changes are capable of avoiding serious economic deterioration and 
political crises which could potentially threaten the lives of their citizenry. 
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USSR 61.4 64.2 81.1
1) 23.2
1) 17.0 73.9
 Armenia 50.8 54.3 71.9 28.4 25.6 90.1
 Azerbaijan 46.7 50.6 81.4 33.9 29.8 87.7
 Belarus 53.5 53.7 74.4 47.3 41.0 86.8
 Estonia 28.5 34.2 59.0 32.9 30.2 91.6
 Georgia 31.4 41.9 65.9 28.9 24.8 85.9
 Kazakhstan 49.5 50.7 67.0 23.5 20.8 88.7
 Kyrgyzstan 33.0 45.9 69.0 32.3 27.7 85.7
 Latvia 38.7 44.9 62.2 41.4 36.7 88.6
 Lithuania 39.2 41.7 66.1 45.5 40.9 89.7
 Moldova 28.4 35.6 48.2 33.0 28.9 87.7
 Russia 69.0 70.7 86.8 18.3 11.1 60.6
 Tajikistan 28.9 32.1 72.4 35.9 31.0 86.5
 Turkmenistan 37.0 30.5 83.0 35.6 33.0 92.5
 Ukraine 58.0 63.1 72.8 29.0 23.8 82.1
 Uzbekistan 34.8 35.5 66.1 28.5 25.5 89.4
Source: Goskomstat SSSR (1990, p. 331), Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994, pp. 4-5, p. 15).
Note:  1) Author's estimation.
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Source: See Annex Table.
Note: 1) Refer to Table 2 for the composition of each group.
            2) Average of 1992 to 2001.
            3) Average of 1997 to 2000.  Includes expenditures for mining and manufacturing,
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 3)Table 2. Institutional Diversity of FSU Countries
Differences in institutional
arrangement Order state Rescue state Punish state
Countermeasures against
systemic shock
The government has a strong leadership.  By leading the whole
industrial world with a centralized authority and key industries
as its core,  the government deals with crises (centralized crisis
management system).
As a general rule, corporations are called upon to deal with a
given crisis based on their judgment of the circumstances and to
act accordingly.  Meanwhile, the government aims at easing the
crisis with monetary/fiscal measures and structural reform
(dispersed crisis management system).
The role of the government is kept strictly separate from that of a
corporation. A much more dispersed crisis management system




Belongs to the government leaders or to the head of
administrative organization entrusted by the government.
It, for the most part, belongs to the manager of the corporation.
The government dispatches its representatives to shareholders'
meetings and/or board of auditors acting as an asset holder.
Belongs in practice to the manager of the corporation.  In many
cases, the government has lost its position as a major shareholder
and does not positively participate in corporate management.
Corporate monitoring and
governance
The government continuously monitors  corporation
management and intervenes when necessary.
The government does not conduct systemic monitoring.
However, when a corporation falls into a critical management
condition, the government  puts ex post facto rescue measures
into action.
When a corporation falls into a critical management condition,
the government holds the manager responsible and reorganizes
and rehabilitates the corporation in accordance with  bankruptcy
law.
Progress toward a market
economy
Private corporate activities are guaranteed by laws, but price
liberalization and corporate privatization are developing slowly.
The status of  private corporations is low.  The state order system
is widely maintained.
Private corporation activities are legislated, and the progress of
price liberalization and corporate privatization is relatively rapid.
Hence,  the market share of the private corporation sector is
rapidly increasing.  Most of the state order system has already
been abolished.
Private corporate shares have considerably surpassed those of
state-owned corporations.  Liberalization is widespread.
Control over trade and
foreign currency
The centralized trade regime is subjected to major export items.
Foreign currency is strictly controlled by the government.  The
surrender requirement of foreign currency income is applied as
well.
The centralized trade regime is practically disestablished.  Free
access to foreign currency reserves and free exchange of national
currency are allowed.
Flexible trade and exchange measures have been introduced to
meet the requirements of the WTO and the EU.
Corporate financing
Corporate financing is, in fact, conducted by direct donation
from the national treasury or concentrated credit supply from
national banks following the government's decision.
Corporate financing is, by and large, dominated by credit supply
and based on the discretion of government financial
organizations and private commercial banks.  Sometimes
financial action and emergency financing measures are taken to
rescue a corporation.
The main source of funds is the equity finance loans from
private commercial banks and the capital market.  Financial
action to rescue corporations is banned, and direct financing
from governmental organizations is limited.
Other complementary
institutions
Corporate sector is overwhelmingly owned by the state.  The
centralized political power is virtually equivalent to that of the
Soviet era.   The leader is charismatic.  The rule of law (the
parliamentary system) is purely symbolic.  Private ownership
rights are slighted.
Domestic corporations are predominantly owned by the state.
Authoritarianism is in place.  The leader tends to be populistic.
The government and industrial worlds are on cozy terms.   The
rule of law (the parliamentary system) is weak.  Private
ownership rights are respected.
Private ownership is predominant in the corporate sector.  The
political system is democratic.  The rule of law (the Parliament)
competes with the state leaders.  Private ownership rights are
protected.
Countries in the category
(2001)
Belarus, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Ukraine.
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.Table 4. Results from the Cluster Analysis
(a) Hierarchical clusters of the reform process in FSU countries. (3 clusters)
Estonia (0.00) Estonia (0.00) Estonia (0.00) Estonia (0.00)
Latvia (2.48) Lithuania (2.74) Lithuania (2.60) Lithuania (2.26)
Lithuania (2.51) Latvia (2.83) Latvia (2.86) Latvia (2.69)
Russia (3.48) Moldova (3.89) Moldova (4.50) Moldova (4.80)
Moldova (4.29) Kyrgyzstan (4.69) Russia (5.29) Georgia (5.37)
Kyrgyzstan (4.59) Russia (4.82) Kyrgyzstan (5.46) Russia (5.47)
Kazakhstan (5.12) Armenia (5.03) Kazakhstan (5.72) Kazakhstan (5.53)
Georgia (5.43) Kazakhstan (5.11) Ukraine (5.75) Kyrgyzstan (5.67)
Armenia (5.55) Georgia (5.73) Georgia (5.82) Ukraine (5.81)
Ukraine (6.09) Ukraine (5.93) Armenia (5.90) Armenia (5.94)
Uzbekistan (7.09) Azerbaijan (6.35) Azerbaijan (6.84) Azerbaijan (7.01)
Azerbaijan (7.54) Tajikistan (7.66) Tajikistan (7.83) Tajikistan (7.68)
Tajikistan (8.06) Uzbekistan (7.31) Uzbekistan (7.57) Uzbekistan (7.80)
Belarus (8.60) Belarus (9.22) Belarus (9.52) Belarus (9.47)
Turkmenistan (10.08) Turkmenistan (10.24) Turkmenistan (10.62) Turkmenistan (10.94)
(̱) Hierarchical clusters of the economic performance in FSU countries. (3 clusters)
Estonia (0.00) Estonia (0.00) Estonia (0.00) Estonia (0.00)
Lithuania (1.70) Lithuania (1.62) Latvia (2.04) Latvia (2.03)
Latvia (2.26) Latvia (1.96) Lithuania (2.05) Lithuania (2.10)
Kyrgyzstan (2.48) Kazakhstan (3.37) Kazakhstan (3.06) Armenia (2.65)
Armenia (2.53) Armenia (2.66) Kyrgyzstan (2.76) Kazakhstan (2.75)
Kazakhstan (2.67) Kyrgyzstan (2.72) Armenia (3.02) Kyrgyzstan (3.04)
Ukraine (3.51) Russia (3.20) Russia (3.30) Russia (3.25)
Moldova (3.61) Moldova (3.98) Georgia (3.76) Azerbaijan (3.77)
Georgia (3.97) Georgia (4.04) Ukraine (3.93) Ukraine (3.80)
Azerbaijan (4.53) Ukraine (4.14) Azerbaijan (4.30) Georgia (3.89)
Tajikistan (6.12) Azerbaijan (4.52) Moldova (4.37) Moldova (4.26)
Russia (3.38) Tajikistan (5.37) Tajikistan (5.23) Tajikistan (5.11)
Uzbekistan (4.47) Turkmenistan (4.55) Turkmenistan (4.39) Belarus (5.44)
Turkmenistan (4.70) Uzbekistan (4.60) Uzbekistan (4.73) Turkmenistan (5.46)
Belarus (4.94) Belarus (5.29) Belarus (5.49) Uzbekistan (5.84)
Source : Author's estimation.






























ᶘTable 5. Evolutionary Path of the Government-Business Relationship in FSU Countries in 1992-2001
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Armenia RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS
Azerbaijan OS OS OS OS RS RS RS RS RS RS
Belarus OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS
Estonia RS RS RS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS
Georgia RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS
Kazakhstan RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS
Kyrgyzstan RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS
Latvia RS RS RS RS RS PS PS PS PS PS
Lithuania RS RS RS RS RS PS PS PS PS PS
Moldova RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS
Russia RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS
Tajikistan OS OS OS OS RS RS RS RS RS RS
Turkmenistan OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS
Ukraine RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS RS
Uzbekistan OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS OS
Source: Author's estimation.









1 10.022 55.68 55.68 Price liberalization -0.208 -0.322 -0.657 -0.539
2 2.801 15.56 71.24 Trade and exchange regime -0.275 -0.171 -0.872 -0.286
3 1.491 8.28 79.52 Small-scale privatization -0.286 0.012 -0.906 0.020
4 1.085 6.03 85.55 Large-scale privatization -0.256 0.080 -0.812 0.134
5 0.738 4.10 89.65 Competition policy -0.187 0.070 -0.591 0.118
6 0.413 2.30 91.95 Banking reform and interest liberalization -0.298 0.060 -0.944 0.101
7 0.352 1.95 93.90 Security market and non-banking sector -0.211 0.327 -0.669 0.548
8 0.331 1.84 95.74 Government intervention 0.227 -0.152 0.719 -0.254
9 0.201 1.12 96.86 Property rights 0.229 -0.172 0.725 -0.289
10 0.149 0.83 97.68 Democratization 0.297 -0.013 0.939 -0.023
11 0.125 0.70 98.38 Rule of law 0.281 -0.036 0.890 -0.060
12 0.092 0.51 98.89
Number of administrative organizations in charge of
industrial policy 0.244 0.077 0.773 0.130
13 0.069 0.39 99.28 % of private sector to GDP -0.286 0.072 -0.906 0.120
14 0.058 0.32 99.60 Annual average of GNP real growth rate -0.036 0.492 -0.113 0.824
15 0.036 0.20 99.80
Annual average of industrial prodection real growth
rate 0.123 0.481 0.389 0.805
16 0.018 0.10 99.90
Weight of expenditure related to the production
sector in national budget 0.183 0.231 0.580 0.387
17 0.011 0.06 99.96
Ratio of fiscal spending of production-related
national budget to GDP 0.140 0.370 0.445 0.619
18 0.007 0.04 100.00 Enterprise reform and corporate governance -0.288 0.125 -0.911 0.210
Source : Author's estimation.
Note: With regard to data sources and basic statistics of the valuables, see Annex Table
Eigenvector Component loading























































Source : Author's estimation.
Note: The two letters at the beginning indicate country; the following two-digit number indicates the year.Table 7. OLS Estimates of Macro-shocks against GDP and Industrial Production in 1992-2001
Const. 0.479 5.028 2.702 -0.937 4.765 0.130 3.927
** 1.162 0.837 1.088 6.893
* -0.053 0.024 -0.422






























(6.90) (4.23) (6.06) (1.95) (4.01) (3.79) (3.22) (6.88) (5.91) (7.79) (0.02) (4.36) (4.83) (3.85)
OSD - - 3.142 - - 9.564
*
- - - 3.210
**
- - - 9.160
***
(1.56) (3.21) (2.38) (4.27)
R
2 0.766 0.549 0.564 0.193 0.594 0.429 0.667 0.680 0.634 0.683 0.200 0.642 0.644 0.567
Adj. R
2 0.744 0.530 0.545 0.119 0.576 0.405 0.643 0.674 0.627 0.676 0.141 0.636 0.636 0.558
F 35.95 28.63 30.59 2.62 34.33 17.79 27.10 124.23 84.13 104.62 3.38 105.10 87.56 63.77
N 25 50 75 25 50 75 30 120 100 150 30 120 100 150
Souce : Author's estimation. With regard to data source, see Annex Table.
Note: 1) Including Azerbaijan and Tajikistan.
ɹɹɹ2) Excluding Azerbaijan and Tajikistan.




























*** -0.507 -0.562 5.250 5.007














(9.16) (7.82) (6.02) (5.75) (6.84) (6.20) (6.37) (5.37) (3.47) (3.38) (4.08) (3.69)
OSD - - 1.581
*** 1.519
*** - - - - 2.851
*** 2.992
*** --
(5.61) (5.23) (6.06) (5.98)
RSD - - 0.844
** 0.783
** - - - - 1.548
** 1.552
*** --
(3.01) (2.72) (3.31) (3.22)
PSD - - 1.354
** 1.265
** - - - - 2.883
** 2.887
** --




*** - - - - 0.249
*** 0.243
***




** - - - - 0.117
** 0.114
**




* - - - - 0.304
* 0.298
*














(6.23) (5.74) (6.69) (6.37) (6.50) (6.09) (3.33) (2.96) (3.59) (3.50) (3.42) (3.18)
ICD/t
2 - 2.271
* - 0.993 - 1.523 - 2.864 - 0.384 - 1.525
(1.98) (0.91) (1.40) (1.46) (0.21) (0.83)
R
2 0.592 0.603 0.666 0.668 0.652 0.656 0.371 0.380 0.500 0.506 0.469 0.471
Adj. R
2 0.587 0.595 0.655 0.654 0.639 0.642 0.363 0.368 0.483 0.485 0.451 0.449
F 106.72 73.86 57.56 48.04 53.86 45.50 43.42 29.89 28.82 24.25 25.43 21.26
N 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Souce : Author's estimation. With regard to data source, see Annex Table.
Note: T-values are given in perentheses beneath parameter significance. ***ɿ Significance at the 1ˋ levelɼ**ɿ Significance at the 5ˋ levelɼ*ɿSignificance at the 10ˋ level.
(J) (A) (B) (G) (I) (H) (L) (K) (C) (F) (D) (E)
GDP INPSource: Author's illustration.
Figure 3. Achievements of Economic Transformation and Future Perspectives of FSU Countries
 Institutional Crystallization
    Turning of Reform Strategy



















Price liberalization 60 2.8 0.4 1.7 3.3 EBRD, Transition Report.
Trade and exchange regime 60 3.1 1.1 1.0 4.3 EBRD, Transition Report.
Small-scale privatization 60 3.4 0.7 2.0 4.3 EBRD, Transition Report.
Large-scale privatization 60 2.7 0.7 1.0 4.0 EBRD, Transition Report.
Competition policy 60 2.0 0.4 1.0 2.7 EBRD, Transition Report.
Banking reform and interest liberalization 60 2.1 0.7 1.0 3.7 EBRD, Transition Report.
Security market and non-banking sector 60 1.9 0.6 1.0 3.0 EBRD, Transition Report.
Government intervention 60 2.8 0.7 2.0 5.0 Heritage Foundation, The Index of Economic Freedom.
Property rights 60 3.5 0.6 2.0 4.0 Heritage Foundation, The Index of Economic Freedom.
Democratization 60 4.5 1.6 1.8 6.9 Freedom House, Nations in Transit.
Rule of law 60 4.8 1.4 2.0 6.8 Freedom House, Nations in Transit.
Number of administrative organizations in
charge of industrial policy
60 8.1 4.7 3 20 ROTOBO, Quarterly ROTOBO Economic Trends.
% of private sector to GDP 60 52.3 15.7 20 75 EBRD, Transition Report.
Weight of expenditure related to production
sector in national budget
60 15.2 7.5 2.9 35.4 Estimated by author based on CISSTAT (2001) and IMF, Country
Report.
Ratio of fiscal spending of production-related
national budget to GDP
60 4.2 2.5 0.7 11.5 Estimated by author based on CISSTAT (2001) and IMF, Country
Report
Enterprise reform and corporate governance 60 2.0 0.5 1.0 3.3 EBRD, Transition Report.
GDP real growth rate (GDP) 150 -2.3 11.6 -44.9 20.5 CISSTAT (2001), EBRD, Transition Report, CIS statistical committee
official figure (http://www.cisstat.com)
Industry production real growth rate(INP) 150 -3.3 15.8 -48.2 60.0 CISSTAT (2001), EBRD, Transition Report, CIS statistical committee
official figure (http://www.cisstat.com)ɼLatvian Central Statiscial
Bureau official figure (http://csb.lv)ɼLithuania Statistical Bureau
Weighted mean of real growth rate of GDP in
FSU (FSU)
150 -2.7 7.4 -15.0 8.7 Estimated by author based on real growth rate of GDP in each country,
per capita income, and population.
Inflation rate (INF) 150 521.3 1475.9 -8.5 15606.5 EBRD, Transition Report Update May 2002 .
Order state dummy (OSD) (Table 6) 150 0.2 0.4 0 1 Estimated by author.
Order state dummy (OSD) (Table 7) 150 1.2 2.6 0 10 Estimated by author.
Rescue state dummy (RSD) 150 3.1 3.2 0 10 Estimated by author.
Punish state dummy (PSD) 150 0.4 1.2 0 7 Estimated by author.
Regional  tension dummy (RTD) 150 0.1 0.3 0 1 Estimated by author.
Initial condition dummy (ICD) 15 -1.7 1.1 -3.4 0.0 EBRD, Transition Report 2001.
Note: 1) Absence of a publishing year indicates that data was cited from several publications.
Basic Statictics
Valuable name Source 
1)